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SPLITTING THE DIFFERENCE:  
LAYSHOCK AND J.S. CHART A SEPARATE 
PATH ON STUDENT SPEECH RIGHTS 
Abstract: On June 13, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit, in Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School District and J.S. ex rel. Snyder 
v. Blue Mountain School District, held that school officials could not constitu-
tionally punish the online, off-campus speech of two students when the 
speech would not foreseeably cause substantial disruption in school. Al-
though the Third Circuit’s results in these cases were consistent with Sec-
ond Circuit precedent, the Third Circuit employed a less restrictive method 
for analyzing limitations on student speech. Accordingly, this Comment ar-
gues that the standards applied by the Third Circuit will lead to decisions in 
future online, off-campus speech cases which will generally be more favor-
able to public school districts than similar cases in the Second Circuit. 
Introduction 
 In 2005, public school officials in Pennsylvania suspended Justin 
Layshock for a “parody profile” of his principal that he had posted 
online while off school property.1 In 2007, officials in a school district 
across the state suspended J.S. for remarkably similar conduct.2 In suits 
challenging the constitutionality of the districts’ actions, separate pan-
els of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued opinions in 
2010 in favor of Layshock in Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School 
District (Layshock III ) and against J.S. in J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain 
School District ( J.S. III ).3 Vacating both opinions, the en banc Third Cir-
cuit held in 2011, in Layshock IV and J.S. IV, respectively, that school of-
ficials had violated each student’s First Amendment rights.4 
                                                                                                                      
1 Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist. (Layshock I ), 412 F. Supp. 2d 502, 
505 (W.D. Pa. 2006). 
2 J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. (J.S. I ), No. 3:07-cv-585, 2007 WL 
954245, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2007). 
3 J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. (J.S. III ), 593 F.3d 286, 308 (3d Cir. 
2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc); Layshock ex rel. 
Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist. (Layshock III), 593 F.3d 249, 264–65 (3d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 
650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
4 J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. (J.S. IV ), 650 F.3d 915, 933 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(en banc), cert. denied, 80 U.S.L.W. 3266 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2012) (No. 11-502); Layshock ex rel. 
Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist. (Layshock IV ), 650 F.3d 205, 219 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
17 
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 In recent years, students’ in-school and out-of-school digital media 
usage has become nearly ubiquitous, contributing to a high volume of 
school speech litigation.5 The U.S. Supreme Court has never explicitly 
discussed whether a school official may punish student speech that oc-
curs outside the supervisory authority of the school.6 Consequently, 
lower courts have often reached conflicting results in these cases.7 
When Layshock IV and J.S. IV were decided, only two student Internet 
speech cases had reached a U.S. Court of Appeals—both in the Second 
Circuit.8 Nonetheless, Layshock IV and J.S. IV indicate a clear intra-
Circuit—and potentially inter-Circuit—split regarding the appropriate 
standards to apply in student Internet speech cases.9 
 Part I of this Comment examines the factual and legal background 
of Layshock’s and J.S.’s cases.10 Part II discusses the four landmark deci-
                                                                                                                      
5 See J.S. IV, 650 F.3d at 951 (Fisher, J., dissenting); Lee Goldman, Student Speech and the 
First Amendment: A Comprehensive Approach, 63 Fla. L. Rev. 395, 396 (2011) (noting that stu-
dent speech cases are among the most frequently litigated under the First Amendment). 
6 See Goldman, supra note 5, at 410. 
7 Compare, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. (J.S. II ), No. 3:07-cv-585, 
2008 WL 4279517, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008) (rejecting J.S.’s First Amendment 
claim), aff’d on other grounds, 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2010), and aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 650 
F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), and Requa v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 492 F. Supp. 2d 
1272, 1273–74 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (refusing to enjoin a school from suspending a student 
for posting a mocking video of his teacher on the Internet), with Layshock ex rel. Layshock 
v. Hermitage Sch. Dist. (Layshock II ), 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 606–07 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (grant-
ing Layshock summary judgment on his First Amendment claim), aff’d, 593 F.3d 249 (3d 
Cir. 2010), and aff’d in part, 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), and Beussink ex rel. 
Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (enjoin-
ing a school from enforcing sanctions on a student for online speech that was critical of 
the school’s administration). 
8 See Emily Gold Waldman, Badmouthing Authority: Hostile Speech About School Officials 
and the Limits of School Restrictions, 19 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 591, 619 & n.181 (2011) 
(noting that these groundbreaking cases were Doninger v. Niehoff (Doninger II ), 527 F.3d 41 
(2d Cir. 2008), and Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist. (Wisniewski II ), 494 
F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007)). Since Layshock IV and J.S. IV, two additional student Internet 
speech cases have reached U.S. Courts of Appeals. See D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. 
Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 766 (8th Cir. 2011) (upholding summary judgment for the 
school district after officials disciplined a student for sending violent messages to another 
student over the Internet); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 
2011) (upholding summary judgment for the district after officials disciplined a student 
for making a website ridiculing a classmate), cert. denied, 80 U.S.L.W. 3247 (U.S. Jan. 17, 
2012) (No. 11-461). 
9 See Layshock IV, 650 F.3d at 222 n.4 ( Jordan, J., concurring) (stating that the majority 
opinion “put[s] distance between our Court and the . . . Second Circuit”). Compare J.S. IV, 
650 F.3d at 950–51 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority opinion creates a cir-
cuit split regarding the appropriate standard to govern student Internet speech), with id. at 
931 n.8 (majority opinion) (stating that the decision creates no such circuit split). 
10 See infra notes 13–24 and accompanying text. 
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sions encompassing the Supreme Court’s school speech jurisprudence 
and their impact on online, off-campus student speech cases in the Sec-
ond and Third Circuits.11 Finally, Part III argues that the mode of analy-
sis employed in J.S. IV will generate conflicting results in the Second and 
Third Circuits in future online, off-campus student speech cases.12 
I. The Students’ School Discipline and Ensuing Litigation 
 In December 2005, Justin Layshock, a twelfth-grade public school 
student in Pennsylvania, used his grandmother’s computer to post a 
“parody profile” of his principal on the social-networking website My-
Space.13 Two years later, in a school district across the state, J.S., an 
eighth-grader, used her parents’ computer to post a similar profile of 
her principal on the same website.14 Layshock and J.S. created and 
posted each profile outside school hours and off school grounds.15 The 
only school district property used by either student was the official 
school district photograph of each principal, which was copied from 
the districts’ official websites and pasted to the students’ profiles.16 The 
profiles sparked discussion at the students’ schools, which caught the 
attention of school officials.17 After meeting with members of the dis-
trict administration and admitting to creating the profiles, both stu-
dents were charged with violating provisions of the schools’ discipline 
codes and were suspended from school for ten days.18 
 The parents of both children brought separate suits, individually 
and on their children’s behalves, in the U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania (Layshock I ) and the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania ( J.S. I ) against their children’s school districts.19 Each 
parent alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.20 The plaintiffs in 
                                                                                                                      
 
11 See infra notes 25–68 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 69–82 and accompanying text. 
13 Layshock IV, 650 F.3d at 207–08. MySpace is one of many social-networking sites al-
lowing members to use an online “profile” to communicate within an “online community.” 
See id. at 208 n.2 (quoting Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 846 (W.D. Tex. 2007), 
aff’d, 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008)). 
14 J.S. IV, 650 F.3d at 920. 
15 Id.; Layshock IV, 650 F.3d at 207. 
16 J.S. IV, 650 F.3d at 920; Layshock IV, 650 F.3d at 207–08. 
17 J.S. IV, 650 F.3d at 921–22; Layshock IV, 650 F.3d at 208. 
18 J.S. IV, 650 F.3d at 921–22; Layshock IV, 650 F.3d at 209–10. 
19 J.S. I, 2007 WL 954245, at *1; Layshock I, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 505–06. 
20 J.S. I, 2007 WL 954245, at *1; Layshock I, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 505–06. The First 
Amendment states: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech[.]” 
U.S. Const. amend. I. This portion of the First Amendment has been incorporated against 
20 Boston College Law Review Vol. 53: E. Supp. 
both cases first filed unsuccessfully for a temporary restraining order 
and preliminary injunction.21 The Western District Court granted Lay-
shock’s subsequent motion for summary judgment; the Middle District 
Court granted the school district’s motion for summary judgment 
against J.S.22 On appeal, separate panels of the Third Circuit affirmed 
each District Court’s judgment on other grounds.23 Rehearing both 
cases en banc, the Third Circuit affirmed the Layshock III panel and re-
                                                                                                                      
the states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. amend. XIV, 
§ 1; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). Section 1983 grants a private right of 
action to any individual within the jurisdiction of the United States who has been deprived 
of constitutional rights by a state actor under color of law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). The 
parents’ Fourteenth Amendment claims are beyond the scope of this Comment. See J.S. I, 
2007 WL 954245, at *1; Layshock I, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 505–06. 
21 J.S. I, 2007 WL 954245, at *2–3 (finding no likelihood of success on the merits or ir-
reparable harm to the student or to the public interest in the absence of preliminary re-
lief); Layshock I, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 508–09 (same). 
22 J.S. II, 2008 WL 4279517, at *6 (holding that the district was empowered to punish a 
student’s “vulgar, lewd, and potentially illegal speech that had an effect on campus”); Lay-
shock II, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 606–07 (holding that there was an insufficient nexus between 
Layshock’s speech and any substantial disruption at school). Notably, the district court found 
that the personal attacks employed in J.S.’s profile were significantly more vulgar and offen-
sive than those appearing in Layshock’s. J.S. II, 2008 WL 4279517, at *8. For example, the 
“tell me about yourself” section of Layshock’s profile included the following text: 
Birthday: too drunk to remember[.] Are you a health freak: big steroid freak[.] 
In the past month have you smoked: big blunt[.] In the past month have you 
been on pills: big pills[.] In the past month have you gone Skinny Dipping: big 
lake, not big dick[.] In the past month have you Stolen Anything: big keg[.] 
Ever been drunk: big number of times[.] Ever been called a Tease: big whore[.] 
Ever been Beaten up: big fag[.] Ever Shoplifted: big bag of kmart[.] Number of 
Drugs I have taken: big[.] 
Layshock IV, 650 F.3d at 208 (alterations to formatting added). In comparison, the “about 
me” section of J.S.’s profile included the following text: 
HELLO CHILDREN[.] yes. it’s your oh so wonderful, hairy, expressionless, 
sex addict, fagass, put on this world with a small dick PRINCIPAL[.] I have 
come to myspace so i can pervert the minds of other principal’s [sic] to be 
just like me. I know, I know, you’re all thrilled[.] Another reason I came to 
myspace is because—I am keeping an eye on you students (who[m] I care for 
so much)[.] For those who want to be my friend, and aren’t in my school[,] I 
love children, sex (any kind), dogs, long walks on the beach, tv, being a dick 
head, and last but not least my darling wife who looks like a man (who satis-
fies my needs) MY FRAINTRAIN . . . . 
J.S. IV, 650 F.3d at 921 (alterations in original). 
23 J.S. III, 593 F.3d at 308 (divided panel holding that J.S.’s speech posed a reasonable 
threat of substantial disruption at school); Layshock III, 593 F.3d at 264–65 (unanimous 
panel holding that Layshock’s expression took place entirely off school property and thus 
his allegedly vulgar, lewd, and offensive speech could not be punished). 
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versed the J.S. III panel, holding that neither school district was em-
powered to punish the students’ off-campus expression.24 
II. School Speech Standards Developed by the Supreme Court 
and Courts of Appeals 
 The U.S. Supreme Court has outlined the extent of students’ 
school speech rights in four cases, none of which concerned student 
speech outside the school context.25 For this reason, lower courts have 
struggled to develop a coherent jurisprudence to govern school disci-
pline of student speech arising from off-campus use of digital media.26 
The first four online student speech cases to reach U.S. Courts of Ap-
peals illustrate the difficulty of applying Supreme Court precedent in 
this developing area of the law.27 
A. The Supreme Court’s Tinker Standard and Subsequent Exceptions 
 In J.S. IV and Layshock IV, the en banc Third Circuit traced the ori-
gin of student speech cases to the landmark 1969 Supreme Court deci-
sion, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.28 In that 
case, John Tinker was suspended from school for wearing a black arm-
band to class to protest the Vietnam War.29 After the District Court’s 
dismissal of Tinker’s suit against his school district, the Supreme Court 
reversed.30 In holding that students do not “shed their constitutional 
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,” the 
Court acknowledged both public school students’ right to speech and 
                                                                                                                      
24 J.S. IV, 650 F.3d at 933; Layshock IV, 650 F.3d at 219; see infra notes 59–68 and accom-
panying text. 
25 See Goldman, supra note 5, at 398–404 (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 400 
(2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 
403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680 (1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 
U.S. 503, 513 (1969)). 
26 See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech 
Rights in the Digital Age, 60 Fla. L. Rev. 1027, 1029 (2008) (“In the last several years, how-
ever, courts have struggled with [students’ digital expression].”). 
27 Compare J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. (J.S. IV ), 650 F.3d 915, 933 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (en banc) (holding for the student), cert. denied, 80 U.S.L.W. 3266 (U.S. Jan. 17, 
2012) (No. 11-502), and Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist. (Layshock IV ), 
650 F.3d 205, 219 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (same), with Doninger v. Niehoff (Doninger II ), 
527 F.3d 41, 53 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding for the school district), and Wisniewski v. Bd. of 
Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist. (Wisniewski II ), 494 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2007) (same). 
28 See J.S. IV, 650 F.3d at 925–26 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506–07); Layshock IV, 650 
F.3d at 212 (same). 
29 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. 
30 Id. at 514. 
22 Boston College Law Review Vol. 53: E. Supp. 
the special circumstances of the school environment, which may re-
quire officials to curtail student speech to ensure the effective function-
ing of schools.31 
 Accordingly, the Court granted deference to school officials to 
punish and prevent in-school student expression in two circumstances: 
when such expression “materially and substantially interfer[es] with the 
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school,” 
and when it “collid[es] with the rights of others.”32 In Tinker, school 
officials’ mere “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance” 
at the prospect of the student’s protest did not rise to the level of a sub-
stantial disruption and thus could not result in punishment.33 
 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have carved out several ex-
ceptions to Tinker’s two-prong standard, while continuing to recognize 
Tinker’s authority over in-school student speech cases.34 By analyzing 
each of these cases within the school context,35 the Court has avoided 
offering lower courts guidance on the extent of students’ off-campus 
speech rights.36 
                                                                                                                      
 
31 See id. at 506–07. 
32 See id. at 513. After the Tinker Court’s pronouncement of this two-prong standard, sub-
sequent courts hearing student speech cases failed to develop or rely on the “colli[sion] with 
the rights of others” prong. See Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 965, 
974 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (finding no court that had relied solely on the “collision of rights” prong 
when deciding school speech cases under Tinker). But see Harper ex rel. Harper v. Poway Uni-
fied Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that an anti-homosexuality mes-
sage on a student’s shirt collided with the rights of others and could be constitutionally prohib-
ited), vacated as moot, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007). 
33 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508–10. 
34 See Morse, 551 U.S. at 410 (holding that school officials may prevent and punish stu-
dent expression at a school-sponsored event that is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal 
drug use); Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273 (holding that school officials may curtail school-
sponsored student expression “so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate 
pedagogical concerns”); Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685 (holding that officials may prevent and 
punish student speech in school that, in the officials’ view, is “lewd and indecent”). 
35 See Morse, 551 U.S. at 400–01; Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 267; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683. The 
most recent of these decisions involved a principal’s suspension of a student who unfurled 
a banner proclaiming “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” during school hours while in the midst of an 
off-campus, school-sponsored activity. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 397–98. In determining that 
the expression effectively occurred “at school,” the Court credited a variety of pertinent 
characteristics of both the activity and the student’s conduct. See id. at 400–01. 
36 See Papandrea, supra note 26, at 1028–29. The Tinker Court held that student speech 
that occurs “in class or out of it” may be constitutionally proscribed by school officials if it 
causes a substantial disruption in school or invades the rights of others. 393 U.S. at 513. 
Some recent opinions have used this language to reason that officials may punish a stu-
dent’s off-campus speech if it satisfies one of Tinker’s two prongs. See, e.g., D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. 
v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 765 (8th Cir. 2011); Layshock IV, 650 F.3d 
at 220 ( Jordan, J., concurring). Yet, preceding the “in class or out of it” phrase, the Tinker 
Court held that “[w]hen [a student] is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the 
2012 Student Speech Rights in Layshock and J.S.  23 
B. The Second Circuit’s Tinker Inquiry for Online, Off-Campus School Speech 
 Although numerous cases concerning online, off-campus student 
speech have been heard in state courts and federal district courts,37 the 
Second Circuit became the first U.S. Court of Appeals to consider the 
issue five years ago.38 In 2007, in Wisniewski v. Board of Education of 
Weedsport Central School District, the Second Circuit held that school dis-
cipline for a student’s off-campus, online expression is constitutional if 
it is reasonably foreseeable that the expression will cause a substantial 
disruption in school.39 The case concerned an eighth grader who sent 
“instant messages” at home from his parents’ personal computer to 
several of his classmates.40 The instant messages contained an icon of a 
pistol shooting a person’s head, spattered blood, and the words “Kill 
Mr. VanderMolen.”41 After a classmate brought a copy of the icon to 
Wisniewski’s English teacher, Philip VanderMolen, Wisniewski was sus-
pended from school.42 
 Wisniewski’s parents brought suit against the school district and 
superintendent, alleging, among other claims, a violation of his First 
Amendment rights.43 On appeal from a grant of summary judgment in 
favor of the school district, the Second Circuit held that the appropri-
ate test for off-campus student expression, reasonably viewed as urging 
                                                                                                                      
campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions” so long as they do not 
trigger one of Tinker’s two prongs. See 393 U.S. at 512–13. Consequently, other recent opin-
ions reason that the “in class or out of it” language refers only to areas outside the class-
room but still on school property. See, e.g., J.S. IV, 650 F.3d at 937 n.1 (Smith, J., concur-
ring); cf. J.S. IV, 650 F.3d at 942 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (noting that the “in class or out of it” 
language is unclear as to the locations it encompasses). 
37 See generally, e.g., Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2010); Mardis v. 
Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist., 684 F. Supp. 2d 1114 (E.D. Mo. 2010), aff’d sub nom. D.J.M. ex rel. 
D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2011); Barnett ex rel. Bar-
nett v. Tipton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 601 F. Supp. 2d 980 (W.D. Tenn. 2009); Requa v. Kent 
Sch. Dist. No. 415, 492 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (W.D. Wash. 2007); Flaherty v. Keystone Oaks Sch. 
Dist., 247 F. Supp. 2d 698 (W.D. Pa. 2003); Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. 
Supp. 2d 779 (E.D. Mich. 2002); Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446 
(W.D. Pa. 2001); Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 
2000); Beussink ex rel. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo. 
1998); J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002). 
38 See Waldman, supra note 8, at 619 & n.181. 
39 494 F.3d at 38–39. 
40 Id. at 35–36. “Instant messages” are text messages that may be transmitted over the 
Internet between two computers. Id. at 35. 
41 Id. at 36. 
42 Id. 
43 Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist. (Wisniewski I ), No. 5:02-CV-
1403, 2006 WL 1741023, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. June 20, 2006), aff’d, 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007). 
24 Boston College Law Review Vol. 53: E. Supp. 
violent conduct, was Tinker’s “substantial disruption” standard.44 The 
court held that off-campus student expression may create a substantial 
disruption in school.45 Furthermore, the court held that it was clear to 
a reasonable person that Wisniewski’s icon could foreseeably make its 
way to officials at the school and create a risk of a substantial disruption 
there.46 Thus, school discipline was constitutionally permitted.47 
 The Wisniewski court developed a two-step inquiry to adapt the 
Tinker standard to students’ off-campus, online expression.48 First, the 
court determined whether it was reasonably foreseeable that the stu-
dent’s off-campus expression would reach the school setting.49 Second, 
the court determined whether it was reasonably foreseeable that the 
expression would create a risk of a substantial disruption at school.50 
Whereas the second inquiry derives from Tinker’s “substantial disrup-
tion” prong, the first implicitly recognizes that allowing schools to dis-
cipline any off-campus, online speech that happens to cause a substan-
tial disruption on campus would expand deference to school 
authorities in a manner not envisioned by the Tinker Court.51 
 Doninger v. Niehoff, decided by the Second Circuit in 2008, con-
cerned an eleventh-grade student who, in her role as junior class secre-
tary, helped to plan a “battle-of-the-bands” concert.52 After a conversa-
                                                                                                                      
44 Wisniewski II, 494 F.3d at 38. 
45 Id. at 39 (citing Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 
1052 n.17 (2d Cir. 1979) (stating that off-campus speech may incite on-campus disrup-
tion)). 
46 Id. at 39–40. 
47 Id. at 40. 
48 See id. at 39–40; see also Harriet A. Hoder, Note, Supervising Cyberspace: A Simple Threshold 
for Public School Jurisdiction over Students’ Online Activity, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 1563, 1581–82 (2009) 
(labeling this two-step inquiry the “foreseeability test”). 
49 See Wisniewski II, 494 F.3d at 39–40. Nonetheless, the panel was divided on the mean-
ing of foreseeability. See id. at 39 n.4. Two judges concluded that foreseeability could be 
shown if the expression did in fact reach campus; yet, Judge John M. Walker concluded 
that foreseeability should mean “foreseeable to a reasonable adult, cognizant of the per-
spective of a student, that the expression might reach campus[.]” See id. 
50 See id. at 39–40. 
51 See id. at 39 n.4. 
Judge Walker believes [that not requiring an initial foreseeability inquiry] 
would run afoul of Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1045 (holding that ‘the arm of 
[school] authority does not [generally] reach beyond the schoolhouse gate’), 
and would raise substantial First Amendment concerns, as it might permit a 
school to punish a student for the content of speech the student could never 
have anticipated reaching the school . . . . 
Id. 
52 527 F.3d at 44. 
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tion with her principal, Doninger posted a message on her personal, 
publicly accessible website stating that the event was “cancelled due to 
douchebags in central office” and suggesting that readers “call [the su-
perintendent] to piss her off more.”53 As a result, officials prohibited 
Doninger from running for senior class secretary.54 
 Doninger’s mother sued the principal, alleging a violation of her 
daughter’s First Amendment rights.55 On appeal from a denial of Don-
inger’s motion for preliminary injunction, the Second Circuit held that 
the Tinker standard, as articulated in Wisniewski, applied to Doninger’s 
off-campus speech.56 The court held, under the two-step framework 
developed in Wisniewski, that it was “reasonably foreseeable that [Don-
inger’s] posting would reach school property” and, once there, that it 
“foreseeably create[d] a risk of substantial disruption within the school 
environment.”57 Accordingly, the school’s sanction was held to be con-
stitutionally permissible.58 
C. The Third Circuit’s Competing Views on Online, Off-Campus School Speech 
 In Layshock IV, the school district based its unsuccessful appeal on 
the “lewd and indecent” standard developed by the Supreme Court in 
its 1986 decision Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,59 rather than on 
Tinker’s “substantial disruption” standard.60 Judge Kent Jordan noted in 
his concurrence that Layshock would have won under the Tinker stan-
dard as well because the district failed to demonstrate a “reasonable 
                                                                                                                      
53 Id. at 45. 
54 Id. at 46. 
55 Doninger v. Niehoff (Doninger I ), 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 211 (D. Conn. 2007), aff’d, 
527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008). 
56 Doninger II, 527 F.3d at 50. 
57 Id. (quoting Wisniewski II, 494 F.3d at 40). In making the first determination, the 
court stated that the posting was intended to encourage members of the school commu-
nity to contact school officials, and that the likelihood of readers complying with the re-
quest was high. Id. In making the second determination, the court stated that the language 
used in the post was potentially disruptive of efforts to resolve the ongoing scheduling 
conflict, the post contained misleading information that would tend to incite disruptive 
conduct on campus, and the post was disruptive of the proper role of the student coun-
cil—of which Doninger was a part—in conflict resolution. Id. at 50–52. 
58 Id. at 53. 
59 478 U.S. at 685. 
60 Layshock IV, 650 F.3d at 219 n.21 (“[T]he issue before us is limited to whether the 
District had the authority to punish Justin for expressive conduct outside of school that the 
District considered lewd and offensive.”). In holding for Layshock, the court noted that 
Fraser only applies to speech within the school context. Id. at 219; see also J.S. IV, 650 F.3d at 
932 (rejecting the school district’s reliance on Fraser when the student’s speech occurred 
outside the school context). 
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apprehension of substantial disruption.”61 The court also noted that 
the lower court had not found a “sufficient nexus” between the speech 
and any alleged substantial disruption at school.62 
 In contrast to the relatively unified Second Circuit decisions in 
Wisniewski and Doninger and the Third Circuit’s decision in Layshock IV, 
J.S. IV produced three highly divergent opinions regarding the appro-
priate standard to govern students’ off-campus, online expression.63 
Although the school district conceded that no substantial disruption 
had occurred, it argued that officials had acted reasonably in forecast-
ing a substantial disruption arising from J.S.’s profile.64 A majority of 
eight judges, comparing the facts to those of Tinker, held that no school 
official could have reasonably foreseen that J.S.’s profile would cause a 
substantial disruption at school.65 Judge Brooks Smith, writing for four 
others, filed a concurring opinion in which he argued that Tinker was 
inapplicable to J.S.’s off-campus expression, which was otherwise pro-
tected under ordinary First Amendment principles.66 Judge Michael 
Fisher, joined by five others, filed a vehement dissent in which he ar-
gued that it was reasonable for school officials in J.S.’s case to forecast a 
substantial disruption to the educational environment.67 Further, the 
                                                                                                                      
61 Layshock IV, 650 F.3d at 220 ( Jordan, J., concurring). 
62 Id. at 216 (majority opinion). 
63 See infra notes 65–68 and accompanying text. 
64 J.S. IV, 650 F.3d at 928. 
65 Id. at 933. The majority gave great weight to the fact that the profile was “so outra-
geous that no one could have taken it seriously, and no one did.” See id. at 930. Because the 
court assumed that Tinker applied to J.S.’s off-campus speech and held that her First 
Amendment rights had been violated under this standard, it had no need to decide 
whether Tinker or the broader free speech protections applicable to the general public 
governed J.S.’s off-campus expression. Compare id. at 926 & n.3 (assuming without deciding 
that Tinker is applicable to J.S.’s off-campus expression), with Wisniewski II, 494 F.3d at 38 
(holding that Tinker is the appropriate standard for a student’s off-campus expression that 
is “reasonably understood as urging violent conduct”), and Doninger II, 527 F.3d at 48 
(holding that the Tinker standard, as articulated in Wisniewski, governs discipline of stu-
dents for “conduct occurring off school grounds, when this conduct ‘would foreseeably 
create a risk of substantial disruption within the school environment,’ at least when it was 
similarly foreseeable that the off-campus expression might also reach campus”). 
66 J.S. IV, 650 F.3d at 940–41 (Smith, J., concurring); see also supra note 36. Judge 
Brooks Smith cited Layshock IV for the proposition that “speech originating off campus 
does not mutate into on-campus speech simply because it foreseeably makes its way onto 
campus.” J.S. IV, 650 F.3d at 940 (Smith, J., concurring). Yet the Layshock IV court made this 
point in its discussion of Fraser, rather than of Tinker. See Layshock IV, 650 F.3d at 219. 
67 J.S. IV, 650 F.3d at 941 (Fisher, J., dissenting). Judge Michael Fisher highlighted sev-
eral distinctions between the facts of Tinker and J.S. IV, including the non-political nature 
of J.S.’s speech, its direction at a school official, and its “vulgar, obscene, malicious, or 
harmful” nature. Id. at 943. Additionally, Judge Fisher stated that J.S.’s profile was “not the 
type of speech that the Tinker Court so vehemently protected.” Id. at 945. 
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dissent posited that the majority’s interpretation of the facts used to 
determine whether a substantial disruption was reasonably foreseeable 
had created a split with the Second Circuit concerning the application 
of off-campus, online student speech standards.68 
III. J.S. IV Produced a Split with the Second Circuit 
 Judge Fisher, in dissent, was correct in asserting that the majority 
in J.S. IV had created a split with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit, but not for the reason he claimed.69 The dissent repeat-
edly questioned the majority’s assessment of the record in J.S. IV in 
light of the facts in Tinker, Wisniewski, and Doninger.70 According to the 
dissent, the obscene and harmful nature of J.S.’s baseless allegations, 
which were targeted at the principal and his family and distributed to 
members of the school community, made a substantial disruption in 
school reasonably foreseeable.71 Based on a comparison of the facts in 
J.S. IV with those in Wisniewski and Doninger, Judge Fisher perceived a 
split with the Second Circuit.72 
                                                                                                                     
 The majority responded by stating that the objective reasonable-
ness of a foreseeable substantial disruption under Tinker is inherently 
dependent on the facts of each case.73 This fact-specific inquiry had 
 
68 Id. at 947 n.4, 950. 
69 See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. (J.S. IV ), 650 F.3d 915, 950 (3d Cir. 
2011) (Fisher, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 80 U.S.L.W. 3266 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2012) (No. 11-
502); Doninger v. Niehoff (Doninger II), 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008); Wisniewski v. Bd. of 
Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist. (Wisniewski II), 494 F.3d 34, 39–40 (2d Cir. 2007). 
70 See J.S. IV, 650 F.3d at 941–47 (Fisher, J., dissenting). 
71 Id. at 951. 
72 Id. The dissent also noted that the Second Circuit had held that “off-campus hostile 
and offensive student Internet speech that is directed at school officials results in a substan-
tial disruption of the classroom environment.” Id. By compressing the two-step Wisniewski 
inquiry into a single question—whether off-campus student speech on the Internet is hostile 
or offensive—the dissent grossly exaggerated the Second Circuit’s jurisprudence. See id.; see 
also id. at 931 n.8 (majority opinion) (arguing that the dissent overstated the Second Circuit’s 
law). Judge Fisher’s rephrasing of Second Circuit precedent would mean that any hostile or 
offensive off-campus student speech directed at school officials on the Internet would neces-
sarily result in a substantial disruption of the classroom environment. See id. at 950 (Fisher, J., 
dissenting). This would violate one of the Second Circuit’s core policy concerns—that the 
deference courts grant to school officials in the administration of discipline for student 
speech is premised on the assumption that this authority “does not reach beyond the school-
house gate.” See Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1044–45 
(2d Cir. 1979). 
73 J.S. IV, 650 F.3d at 928 (“[O]ur independent examination of the record fails to yield evi-
dence that the school authorities had reason to anticipate . . . substantial[] interfere[nce] 
with the work of the school . . . .” (emphasis added) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. 
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969))). 
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been undertaken by the majorities in all three Second and Third Cir-
cuit cases applying Tinker to online, off-campus student speech.74 In 
contrast to the dissent, and to distinguish J.S. IV from Doninger, the ma-
jority focused on the outrageousness of J.S.’s claims and her lack of in-
tent to target the school.75 Although the majority’s and dissent’s differ-
ing factual assessments demonstrate that judges may, under Tinker, view 
the record of a particular case in different lights, the dissent failed to 
prove that the Second Circuit would have necessarily decided J.S.’s case 
differently given the same record.76 
 The divergent paths taken by the Second and Third Circuits in 
their Tinker analyses provide a stronger basis to contend that J.S. IV cre-
ated a circuit split.77 In J.S. IV, the Third Circuit skipped directly to the 
second step of the two-part Tinker inquiry developed in Wisniewski and 
failed to determine if it was reasonably foreseeable that J.S.’s speech 
would reach the school.78 Because the Second Circuit has given no in-
dication that the two steps must be considered sequentially,79 the Third 
Circuit’s holding in J.S. IV, that a substantial disruption was not rea-
sonably foreseeable, obviated any need to undertake the first inquiry.80 
 In future online, off-campus student speech cases, however, the re-
sults could very well differ between the two circuits if the Third Circuit 
continues to use a one-step inquiry and maintains that a substantial dis-
ruption is reasonably foreseeable regardless of whether it is reasonably 
foreseeable that the speech would reach campus.81 Because the first step 
of the Wisniewski inquiry provides additional protection for students 
whose off-campus expression could not reasonably have been foreseen 
                                                                                                                      
74 See id. at 928–31 & n.8 (comparing the record in that case with those of Tinker, Don-
inger, and Wisniewski to determine that “[t]he facts simply do not support [a] reasonabl[e] 
forecast[ of] a substantial disruption”); Doninger II, 527 F.3d at 50–53 (examining the re-
cord in light of the standard developed in Tinker and adapted in Wisniewski II to determine 
that a substantial disruption was reasonably foreseeable); Wisniewski II, 494 F.3d at 39–40 
(determining that, based on the record, no reasonable jury could disagree as to the rea-
sonable foreseeability of a substantial disruption). 
75 See J.S. IV, 650 F.3d at 930–31. 
76 See id.; supra notes 69–75 and accompanying text. 
77 Compare J.S. IV, 650 F.3d at 930–31 (failing to make a determination regarding 
whether it was reasonably foreseeable that J.S.’s off-campus expression would reach the 
school setting), with Doninger II, 527 F.3d at 50–51 (finding that it was foreseeable for Don-
inger’s expression to reach the school), and Wisniewski II, 494 F.3d at 39–40 (finding that 
the instant messages could foreseeably make their way to the school context). 
78 See J.S. IV, 650 F.3d at 930–31. 
79 See Doninger II, 527 F.3d at 50–51; Wisniewski II, 494 F.3d at 39–40. 
80 See J.S. IV, 650 F.3d at 930–31 (holding that “it was clearly not reasonably foreseeable 
that J.S.’s speech would create a substantial disruption”). 
81 See id.; Doninger II, 527 F.3d at 50–51; Wisniewski II, 494 F.3d at 39–40. 
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to reach the school environment, it is likely that the Third Circuit ap-
proach will permit more schools to discipline students for off-campus 
expression in the future; in contrast, the Second Circuit approach 
would likely uphold a student’s free speech rights given similar facts, 
despite the particular outcomes in Wisniewski, Doninger, and J.S. IV.82 
Conclusion 
 The en banc Third Circuit held in Layshock IV and J.S. IV that each 
school district acted outside its constitutional authority when it sus-
pended Layshock and J.S. for their off-campus, online speech. In Lay-
shock IV, the court held that the Fraser “lewd and offensive” standard is 
inapplicable to speech originating off school grounds. The J.S. IV court, 
assuming without deciding that the Tinker standard applied to J.S.’s off-
campus speech, held that the record did not permit a reasonable 
school official to forecast a substantial disruption in the school envi-
ronment. The dissent in J.S. IV posited that the majority opinion had 
created a split with the Second Circuit. The majority countered that the 
                                                                                                                      
82 See J.S. IV, 650 F.3d at 930–31; Doninger II, 527 F.3d at 50–51; Wisniewski II, 494 F.3d at 
39–40. In addition to the federal circuit split, the Third Circuit’s approach to online, off-
campus student speech cases appears to create a split with the Pennsylvania state courts. 
Compare J.S. IV, 650 F.3d at 930–31 (failing to make a threshold determination whether it 
was reasonably foreseeable for off-campus speech to reach the school setting), with J.S. ex 
rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 865, 869 (Pa. 2002) (making a thresh-
old determination that there was a “sufficient nexus” between off-campus speech and the 
school setting). In 2002, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held in J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Beth-
lehem Area School District that a public school could constitutionally expel a student whose 
personal, publicly accessible website had a “sufficient nexus” to the school and caused a 
substantial disruption there. 807 A.2d at 865, 869. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s 
“sufficient nexus” inquiry employed a totality test to determine, as a threshold matter, 
whether a student’s off-campus speech should be analyzed under school speech prece-
dents or under general First Amendment principles. See id. at 865 & n.12; Hoder, supra 
note 48, at 1583 (describing the “sufficient nexus” test). Although the “sufficient nexus” 
inquiry is not identical to Wisniewski’s first-step inquiry into whether it is reasonably fore-
seeable for a student’s online, off-campus speech to reach campus, both tests limit a 
school’s ability to punish or prevent this type of speech on a bare showing that the expres-
sion was reasonably foreseen to threaten substantial disruption at school. See Wisniewski II, 
494 F.3d at 39–40; Bethlehem, 807 A.2d at 865 & n.12; Christine Metteer Lorillard, When 
Children’s Rights “Collide”: Free Speech vs. the Right to Be Let Alone in the Context of Off-Campus 
“Cyber-Bullying”, 81 Miss. L.J. 189, 263 n.279 (2011) (noting the similarity between the two 
inquiries). Because parents of public school students in Pennsylvania may bring suit 
against a child’s school district alleging violations of First Amendment rights in state or 
federal court, the extra protection provided to students by Pennsylvania’s “sufficient 
nexus” inquiry provides an incentive for parents to bring future suits in Pennsylvania state 
court rather than in federal court. See J.S. IV, 650 F.3d at 930–31; Bethlehem, 807 A.2d at 865 
& n.12. 
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reasonableness of a school official’s forecast of a substantial disruption 
is a fact-dependent inquiry—a proposition accepted in both circuits. 
 The debate over factual interpretation in J.S. IV obscures the split 
between the Second and Third Circuits arising from the courts’ differ-
ent methods of analyzing online, off-campus student speech cases un-
der Tinker. Despite the particular outcome in J.S. IV, the Third Circuit’s 
less restrictive application of the Tinker standard in online, off-campus 
student speech cases will likely produce results more favorable to public 
school districts than those of the Second Circuit in future decisions. 
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